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THE WORK OF INTERPRETATION: A THEORETICAL DEFENCE OF FILM THEORY
AND CRITICISM
READING on both critical theory and aesthetics has taught me is that anything -- namely art, and for my
own personal purposes, movies -- can help us improve our moral wherewithal and self-understanding. Surely
this is not what half of the artists intended their art to be used for, but nonetheless, critics and theorists
do it all of the time, and with productive results. Yet, although those who believe in the didactic force of
movies do so wholeheartedly, film theorists of the humanist sort are part of an overwhelming minority. This
is especially true when weighed against the number of general moviegoers who see films as a means to get
away from moral arguments, not to get into them. In other words, moviegoers often go above and beyond
the duty of ignoring interpretive theories of movies; they are repulsed by such theories. What most people
believe is that movies are fiction, and because of that, they teach us nothing.
In a brilliant essay about the dichotomy between the Hollywood marketplace and the university, Jonathan
Rosenbaum observes that because the term ”classic cinema” has
become a standard fixture in University prose, the necessity for [an interrogation which would
finally construct its theory] has seemingly vanished, leaving the term to reap ideological havoc
as it continues to validate an object that has not yet even achieved theoretical status. (1)
Film theory and criticism in itself has been taken for granted in a similar fashion. Those who see film theory
and film interpretation as invalid misunderstand critical theory. That is partly due to the fact that film theory
itself has not yet achieved theoretical status in the sense that it is readily understood and explicitly endorsed
by those who apparently value it, let alone those who do not. Even T. S. Eliot notes that ”a moderate
number of persons have engaged in what is called ’critical’ writing, but no conclusion is any more solidly
established than it was [a century ago].”(2) It has been the task of some philosophers who call themselves
’critical theorists’ to try and articulate and validate the need for interpretive analysis as criticism, and it
would serve film theorists and/or critics well to follow some of this work, since their profession relies wholly
on interpretation.
Let us briefly outline the work of two significant contributors to the field of critical theory -- David Hoy, a
prominent American philosopher, and Theodor Adorno, who, with Max Horkheimer, began the Frankfurt
School in the 1930s and 1940s. Some of their groundbreaking work in the field of interpretative critical
theory -- better known in philosophy as hermeneutics -- can serve as a useful foundation with which to help
justify interpretation in film theory. Though an exercise in polemics, film theory and criticism should be
a profession valued more widely than it is, because of its moral content and value. Through a series of
similarities that link hermeneutics to interpretation of film, a moral strand within film theory and criticism
will be visible, thus reemphasizing the moral force and responsibilities and that a film critic should adhere
to. Self-proclaimed critics such as T. S. Eliot, David Browne, and Peter Wollen implicitly recognize a form
of hermeneutical inquiry, and it is because of the very close links to an established form of philosophical
inquiry that their pursuits can be further validated, and, in the words of Rosenbaum, achieve theoretical
status.
As a critical theorist, David Hoy is very interested in elevating theory to theoretical status, so that such
a process would both further justify and further articulate critical theory. What I am chiefly interested in
with concern to Hoy’s work is his defence of the work of Theodor Adorno, who serves to exemplify critical
aesthetic theory in such a way that demonstrates the usefulness of art when it comes to understanding moral
and critical issues. What I hope to do here, is to briefly outline Hoy’s (and thus Adorno’s) argument for
hermeneutic interpretation. I only wish to outline the argument, so that characteristic features of it can be
seen within the work of Eliot, Wollen, Browne and Rosenbaum -- theorists who are directly concerned, it will
then seem, with the legitimacy of hermeneutics as it applies to artistic (and more specifically, film) theory.
There are many different concepts that both Hoy and Adorno touch upon in order to justify theory of their
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sort, but what should be of primary concern here are two concepts. One, that hermeneutics serves to create
anew the art form being analysed, and two, that it serves to unmask the myths surrounding the object of
criticism in order to make the object more suitable to our individual and collective moral concerns.(3)
It may go without saying that once one interprets something in a certain manner, that the interpretation will
’stick,’ though often in the midst of ongoing debate. In other words, the object interpreted will forever recall
those images or ideas that the interpretation is associated with. Indeed, it would be difficult for Adorno to
henceforth read Homer’s The Odyssey without seeing in it the plight of self-alienation and self-domination
within which the modern self is trapped.(4) With more specific attention to movies, Browne likely notices the
moral politics of rigid social hierarchy and intolerance each time he views the scene of the meal at the Dry
Fork Station in Stagecoach.(5) Such observations may seem obvious -- perhaps even redundant -- but this type
of relationship towards objects of interpretation means something important in a more abstract sense. Once
one draws an interpretation from something, it can forever alter the conception of the thing interpreted. In
other words, ”the process of applying the [interpretation] inevitably transforms it. In general, hermeneutics
is the analysis of this process and its conditions of possibility.”(6) The work interpreted is altered by the
interpretation of it, and this empowers the interpreter -- the critic -- with a certain aesthetic creative power.
This means that part of the message within the work of art would not exist without the critic’s interpretation
of it as such. The importance of this power will be seen below, in connection to criticism of art and/or film.
David Hoy touches upon this creative process during his analysis of Adorno in Critical Theory when he
discusses determinate negation. Originally put forth by Hegel, determinate negation involves critique and
interpretation of the object criticized, in order to produce something new from it. Because these interpre-
tations are done by people, and are thus intertwined with our daily judgment and practices, determinate
negation allows for a constant reshaping of those judgments and practices through interpretation. (In a very
direct sense, this gives these interpretations a normative, moral force.) As Hoy describes the process that
Adorno uses, a set of beliefs are not left behind for new ones, but rather it ”breaks down ... for specific
reasons internal to itself, and the effort to rectify itself leads to a particular reconfiguration that follows.”(7)
This means that any interpretation made of an object criticized holds the keys to that interpretation within
itself, but more importantly, that the object is ’reconfigured.’ It is transformed by the creative powers of
those interpreting. This is one of the characteristic elements of hermeneutics, and it is endorsed by Hoy in
his discussion of Adorno.
Also, such a process would not be possible without a necessary interpretive outlook called the hermeneutics
of suspicion. This outlook entails taking a ’suspicious’ stance towards objects of criticism, so that such a
stance will aim at uncovering hidden complexes of meaning that can only be found underneath the initial,
intended meaning. Put this way, determinate negation is like extracting hidden meaning found somewhere
inside the object of criticism. As Adorno puts it in The Dialectic of Enlightenment, interpretation must
”[interpret] every image as writing. It shows how the admission of falsity is to be read in the lines of its
features -- a confession that deprives it of its power and appropriates it for truth.”(8) This must entail finding
hidden meaning behind the surface myths of immediacy, because if the object of criticism were collapsible
on the surface, it would hold no initial force, and thus would not need any interpretation. In terms of film
theory and criticism, the hermeneutics of suspicion is vital, since virtually every attempt at film theory aims
at an interpretation that differs from immediate, responses that one gets from a film.
Although Adorno’s (and Hoy’s) use of determinate negation has very negative undertones, I do not wish
to imply that this need always be the case. Indeed, Adorno uses determinate negation and hermeneutics
to unmask the myth of enlightenment in order to expose it as something not positive at all. Terms like
’falsity’ and ’breaks down’ imply a constantly negative and deconstructivist tone. However, I only wish to
point out that interpretation involves an act of creation on the part of the critic, and that this often involves
unmasking the hidden meanings within the object of criticism. It does not need to be a negative critique.
As Hoy’s interlocutor, Thomas McCarthy points out, ”it allows for a critical reconstruction ... through
which [interpretations] are given sociocultural forms rather than simply dismantled.”(9) Each time we watch
a movie we do this, and we do it by creating new meaning for ourselves. It will shown below is that this
process has a moral content. The fact that McCarthy sees determinate negation as a process during which
interpretations are given social form gets closer at the idea that interpretive work carries with it a social and
moral force.
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Before linking both Hoy and Adorno’s work to film theory and criticism, I want to point out the connections
between their work and the critical work of T. S. Eliot. Eliot’s wording of the critical enterprise is very
close to the views of Adorno and Hoy -- much closer than that of Wollen’s and Browne’s -- and can thus
provide a useful bridge between hermeneutic critical theory as a philosophical enterprise, and hermeneutic
critical theory as an artistic enterprise. As both a poet and an astute literary critic, Eliot himself represents
both sides of the bifurcation that critical theory often undergoes by existing within either the artist, or the
theorist/critic. Fitting then, that Eliot sees this division as illusory:
The poetic critic is criticizing poetry in order to create poetry ... It is fatuous to say that criticism
is for the sake of ’creation’ or creation for the sake of criticism. It is also fatuous to assume that
there are ages of criticism and ages of creativeness, as if by plunging ourselves into intellectual
darkness we were in better hopes of finding spiritual light. The two directions of sensibility are
complementary; and as sensibility is rare, unpopular, and desirable, it is to be expected that the
critic and the creative artist should frequently be the same person.(10)
Among other things, I see this to mean that the critic is endowed -- by the ambiguity of works of art -- with
powers of creation comparable to that of the original artist.(11) In Eliot’s words, ”A record ... is also an
interpretation, a translation; for it must itself impose impressions upon us, and these impressions are as much
created as transmitted by the criticism.”(12) Interpretation is creative in nature, and since Adorno remains
necessarily open-ended and fallible in his analyses, he would agree with Eliot in that ”the question is not
whether [the critic’s] impressions are ’true’ or ’false.’”(13) True or false, that is, in the sense that they match
up with the original intentions of the work of art. A concern about being ’true’ to the original artist can
dangerously restrict the power of the critic’s interpretive skills to the extent that they become nonexistent.
The similarities between Eliot’s conception of an artistic critic and that of Hoy’s and Adorno’s get at the
very core of interpretation as determinate negation. In terms of film, the interpretation that one inevitably
draws from a film transforms the way that film is understood. The moment you decide that Pleasantville
is a metaphor for the political friction between left and right wing stereotypes, it is difficult to turn back.
Signifiers appear everywhere -- even where they were invisible during a previous viewing -- and the film is
no longer a naive tale of teenage freedom. With this fairly ’simple’ interpretation of an equally ’simple’ film,
we now see how easy it can be to get involved in moral matters when interpreting a film.
But why is this so? Nick Browne, and his essay, ”The Spectator-In-The-Text: The Rhetoric of Stagecoach,”
can get us a step closer. By focussing on a seemingly unimportant scene in Ford’s film, Browne draws upon
many implicit and subtle signs in order to illustrate certain moral conventions and restrictive social roles that
play a role within society. By doing so, Browne believes that he has tapped ”the guiding moral commentary
of the film,”(14) a place for the spectator to locate him or herself in relation to the narrator or narrative. For
Browne, this ’place’ ”is defined through the variable force of identification” with certain characters within the
film.(15) Browne makes a very important move by calling this identification an emotional bond. By doing so
he characterizes narrative suture as something which -- especially since one need not identify with a character
of similar view to one’s own -- can evoke issues of morality within the spectator/interpreter. These issues, as
Browne has it, construct certain moral judgments and expectations about how the narrative should unfold
itself. Because these judgments concern the well being of characters within the film, a decision to uphold, or
even disregard, certain moral judgments and expectations about the narrative constitutes a moral decision. A
decision to side with either Lucy or Dallas can be a decision of no other type; the decision holds distinct,
normative consequences for one’s positioning within what Browne calls ”the moral order of the text.”(16)
This is not unlike the unquestionably moral move we make to position ourselves in respect to political issues
that do not affect us personally.(17)
More needs to be said though, about the connection between film theory and/or criticism and the hermeneutic
work endorsed by Hoy and Adorno. Peter Wollen and his discussion about the auteur theory(18) can be of
much use here. First, Wollen can be connected to hermeneutics because he believes that an audience’s
interpretation can indeed transform the film being viewed:
The auteur theory, as I conceive it, insists that the spectator has to work at reading the text ...
In these cases, in a certain sense, the film changes, it becomes another film -- as far as experience
of it is concerned. It is no longer possible to look at it ’with the same eyes’.
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In this sense, Wollen is a hermeneutic film theorist. In fact, his interesting take on the auteur theory posits
the audience (read: critic) as auteur, as the creative hero. It is the audience that makes the distinctions
between different directors plausible and legitimate.
But Wollen argues for hermeneutics and determinate negation in a different sense as well, because he sees
the audience as involved in a process ”of decipherment, decryptment”(19) that requires extraction of hidden
meaning. Just as noted above with Adorno, the critic must seek out ”an unconscious, unintended meaning
[that is] decoded in the film, usually to the surprise of the individual involved.”(20) This is especially important
to both hermeneutics and film theory, because this means that the directors, and their visions themselves are
not identical to legitimate interpretations of their films, and Wollen notes this in the passage that succeeds
the one mentioned above. Adorno’s view of The Odyssey is not to be confused with Homer’s, nor is Tania
Modleski’s view of Hitchcock to be confused with Hitchcock’s conscious intentions while making any of his
films.
And, just as with Browne, these interpretations carry moral value, in the sense that they help us cope with
the world around us and improve our self-understanding:
The world itself is an untidy place, full of loose ends, but the artefact can tie all these loose ends
together and thus convey to us a meaningful truth, an insight, which enables us to go back to the
real world with a reordered and recycled experience which will enable us to cope better, live more
fully, and so on. In this way art is given a humanistic function, which guarantees its value.(21)
Jonathan Rosenbaum, one of our more ’moral’ film critics, argues a similar idea concerning the moral force
of film: ”... I believe movies are potentially important enough to be tested in relation to life, not simply
accepted as loose approximations or escapist alternatives.”(22) It is in Rosenbaum that I find my main
point: watching (read: interpreting) movies constitutes making a moral judgment about both the film’s
subject matter and the world around us. Rosenbaum sees the uncanny way in which ”our news resembles
our so-called entertainment and vice versa”(23) as an indication of the political power that movies hold.
Indeed, one cringes upon noticing the eerie smoothness with which a pretend CNN and a film narrative like
Independence Day’s push each other along.(24) And, what is perhaps the best indication of things moral
are the consequences that follow when such moral content is unnoticed, or even shunned. As Rosenbaum
divulges:
”Keep your politics out of your reviews,” wrote an irritated reader in 1993 (as if he or I had a
choice in the matter). ”It’ll destroy your credibility.” But keeping politics out of movie reviews,
I’d argue, is precisely what makes it easy to cheer and celebrate such CNN ”movies” or ”turkey
shoots” -- as OPERATION DESERT STORM and WAR IN THE GULF.(25)
What happens when our attitudes or abilities within a moral sphere dwindle? The lines between what was
once acceptable and what was once morally objectionable begin to dwindle as well. I do not mean to imply
that the film critic/theorist alone can re-trace these lines, but the fact that Rosenbaum can call attention to
such issues from within interpretations of films says a great deal about the moral force of interpretation.
Without interpretive work, Rosenbaum would not be able to draw these inferences from movies. Because of
this, interpretation, or hermeneutics carries with it a moral force, and the critic is at its core. As I stated
above, in my discussion of Adorno and Hoy, the person interpreting possesses creative power, in the sense that
they can create new meaning for an object of criticism -- a meaning that is hidden. Linked to a need to use
film in order to articulate things that have gone morally astray (as Rosenbaum has noted above), this power
means that interpretation of movies should be, and thus is, moral. As the old adage goes, with great power
comes great responsibility. With responsibility comes a moral force; a film theorist could examine countless
other interpretations of a film other than his or her own, but they make a decision to endorse the one that
they do. This is something more than taste. It is a moral judgment, because, as Rosenbaum states, we can
”use films as a way to speak about other things in our society: racism, xenophobia, targeting, tribalism...”(26)
The interpretations which we use to do so is no trivial matter: ”To go to the cinema, to read a book, or
to listen to music is to be a partisan. Evaluation cannot be impartial.”(27) Many more philosophers other
than Hoy and Adorno use interpretations of things not immediately useful in order to help us understand
ourselves and the world we live in. As noted above, with McCarthy, determinate negation allows a critic to
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give interpretations ”sociocultural forms.” Critical theorists appropriate certain things for moral use. So do
film theorists and film critics, and to deny such moral relevance within film is to make an equally significant
moral decision.
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